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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
"constructive desertion" will be used because of the statement of the Superior
Court which we have quoted from Hartner v. Hartner.29  All the signposts
indicate that constructive desertion will continue as a part of Pennsylvania
law, but that it will be known simply as "wilful and malicious desertion."
E. M. Buchen.
PRESENT STATUS OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN
PENNSYLVANIA
This note is limited to a general discussion of the present parol evidence
rule as contrasted with previous decisions in which the rule was enlarged by
the addition of the so-called "contemporaneous parol agreement" exception.
The rule has so many specific applications and exceptions that it would be
impossible to deal with all of them here, and consequently only the general
rule and the aforesaid one main exception will be considered.
The general common law rule as stated in Corpus Juris' is:
"When any judgment of any court, or any other judicial or official pro-
ceeding, or any grant or other disposition of property, or any contract, agree-
ment, or undertaking has been reduced to writing, and is evidenced by a
document or series of documents, the contents of such document can not be
contradicted, altered, added to, or varied by parol or extrinsic evidence."
Another expression of the rule as applied by the Pennsylvania courts is:
"The writing thus becomes the expression of the final result of the nego-
tiations between the parties and is the best and only evidence of the transac-
tion, all preliminary agreements and conversations being presumed to have
been merged in such writing, and parol evidence to contradict or vary its
terms is therefore inadmissible.
' '
2
Although the old common law rule was very strict as is shown by the
statement of the law from Corpus Jutis, and was practically the same as the
present Pennsylvania view, the earlier Pennsylvania courts were much more
liberal in allowing the admission of parol evidence. There was no necessity
practical significance is in the situation where the wife leaves the home because of the cruel
and barbarous treatment of her husband. If she asks for a divorce on the ground of desertion,
the husband might show as a valid defence that he had made an offer to take her back;
Kumiker u. Kumiker, 94 Pa. Super. Ct. 257. On the other hand, if she brought suit on the
ground of cruelty, the offer to take her back would not be a defence.
ZsCited Supra in Note 8.
122 Corpus Juris 1070.
21Hcry, Penna. Trial Evidence, p. 381.
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to allege fraud, accident, or mistake in the procuring of the contract, and even
though the earlier courts quoted the general rule with approval, they added
another exception where parol evidence could be introduced to contradict a
writing. This exception is commonly spoken of as the "contemporaneous
parol agreement" exception. One of the theories back of it is that although
there was no fraud in the procuring of the contract, there was fraud which
occurred subsequently-that is, when the parol agreement was broken. Some
courts, however, ignored the necessity for any type of fraud, and merely
stated the exception to be that if there was a parol agreement between the
parties which induced the making of a contract, it could be shown even
though it contradicted the written instrument.
As is stated by the court in Speier v. Michelson3 : "The Parol Evidence
Rule was steadily widened so that almost any promise was sufficient to invade
the security of a written contract."
A typical example of this liberal application of the Parol Evidence Rule is'
Gandy v. Weckerly. The facts in this case were that the defendant gave the
plaintiff a promissory note for $1250. Plaintiff sued on the note, and defen-
dant alleged a parol agreement between him and plaintiff whereby plaintiff
had promised that defendant would not be called upon to pay the note. De-
fendant then alleged that he was induced to make the note because of this
agreement. The court quoted with approval from Greenawalt v. Kohne5 :
"Where at the execution of a writing, a stipulation has been entered
into, a condition annexed, or a promise made by word of mouth, upon the faith
of which the writing has been executed, parol evidence is admissible although
it may vary and materially change the terms of the contract."
"Parol evidence is admissible to alter, vary, or contradict a written in-
strument where such evidence is an oral agreement contemporaneous with the
execution of the writing and on the faith of which the instrument was exe-
cuted."
This doctrine has been enunciated by many cases6 among them Keough
v. Leslie.7 In this case plaintiff sued on a book account for "paper patterns."
Defendant alleged as a defense a parol agreement whereby plaintiff's agent
had said he need only be liable for those he actually sold. The court held
that this defense was sufficient, and that evidence of the parol agreement was
s303 Pa. 66 (1931).
'220 Pa. 285 (1908).
585 Pa. 369 (1877).
oPhillips v. Meily, 106 Pa. 536 (1884): Thomas & Sons v. Loose, Seaman & Co., 114 Pa.
35 (1886); Cullmans v. Lindsay, 114 Pa. 166 (1886); Martin v. Fridenberg, 169 Pa. 447
(1895); Fidelity 6 Casualty Co. v. Harder, 212 Pa. 96 (1905); Phillips Gas 8 Oil Co. v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 213 Pa. 183 (1906); Croyle v. Cambria Land & Improvement Co..
233 Pa. 310 (1912); Potter v. Grimm, 248 Pa. 440 (1915); Humbert v. Meyers, 279 Pa. 171
(1924).
792 Pa. 424 (1880).
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admissible.
The first case to break away from the old and more liberal view was
Second National Bank of Reading v. Yeager 8 but the first decision which
really recognized the new and strict rule-that only fraud, accident, or mis-
take in the procuring of the written instrument may be shown by parol
evidence to contradict the writing-was Gianni v. Russell." In this case Mr.
Justice Schaffer quotes with approval from Martin v. Berens'°:
"Where parties without any fraud or mistake have deliberately put their
engagements in writing the law declares the writing to be not only the best
but the only evidence of their agreement."
In the Gianni case there was a lease in which the lessee was "to use the
premises only for the sale of fruit, candy," etc., and he was not "to sell tobac-
co in any form." The lessee offered to show by parol evidence that he had
entered into this contract by reason of a parol agreement between himself and
the lessor that he (lessee) was to havq an exclusive right to sell drinks in the
building, and that as a result of this concession he had promised that he would
not sell any tobacco. The court repudiated the liberal application of the
Parol Evidence Rule and held that such evidence of the contemporaneous
parol agreement was inadmissible.
A case which followed this applied the same rule. In First National
Bank of Hooversville v. Sagerson1 the action was on a promissory note. The
maker of the note alleged a parol contemporaneous agreement whereby he
was not to be held liable in any way upon the note. The court held:
"A breach of faith or of an agreement regarding the doing or refraining
from doing something in the future is not fraud as that word is employed in
the phrase 'fraud, accident, or mistake'."
And also : "if the integrity of written instruments is to be upheld ....
appellee must show presence of some legal fraud, accident, or mistake before
the defense he seeks to make (evidence of contemporaneous parol agreement)
is available,"
The facts in Speier v. Michelson12 are very similar to the above case. The
action was on a promissory note and defendant averred a parol agreement
subjecting payment of the instrument to certain conditions. The court held
that this was inadmissible under the strict interpretation of the Parol Evi-
dence Rule.
The Speier case is a very important one in the development of the strict
rule in this state for it states the present rule and also contrasts it with the old
and more liberal view. The court in this case says :
8268 Pa. 167 (1920).
9281 Pa. 320 (1924).
1067 Pa. 459 (1871).
1L283 Pa. 406 (1925).
12303 Pa. 66 (1931).
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"Any parol agreement that subjects the obligation on the instrument to
any condition or contingency, whether in person, time, or amount, is ineffec-
tive, and the instrument is unconditional, unless fraud, accident, or mistake
was the means through which the instrument was procured."
Another recent case which gives a good interpretation of the law is
Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. B. P. Dunn Home-Site Co.'3 It is held there
that the writing must be the entire contract between the parties if parol
evidence is to be excluded, and to determine this, if the writing shows a com-
plete legal obligation in itself without uncertainty, it is presumed conclusively
that the whole engagement of the parties was reduced to writing.
The doctrine of these cases has been followed by the courts of Pennsyl-
vania in other decisions," and this shows that now Pennsylvania has adopted
the strict rule, and that there must be legal fraud, accident, or mistake in order
to permit parol evidence to contradict, alter or vary written instruments.
There are several reasons advanced for the change in the rule. In the
first place the old rule practically discounted the effect of a written contract.
Consequently, a great deal of litigation which should never have arisen was
dragged through the courts, because in many instances people tried to con-
coct some sort of verbal agreement so that they could avoid their obligations
which had arisen under the writing. It was so easy to get out of a written
contract that the value of putting a contract in writing was practically de-
stroyed. Not only could unscrupulous persons take advantage of a rule
which was ideally suited for their purposes of practising fraud on others with
whom they had contracted, but even in the case of persons who were per-
fectly honest and sincere there was a great deal of litigation due to the
admissibility of oral testimony. Now with the courts adopting the strict rule
which gives proper weight to written instruments, this litigation is discouraged
due to the refusal to admit this oral testimony. Another practical reason for
the adoption of the strict rule is that it is the logical result of modern commer-
cial requirements. In these days when there are so many contracts made
every day the only practical way of settling any disputes arising therefrom is
to limit the evidence to the four-corners of the instrument. Otherwise, not
only would the opportunities for fraud be unlimited, but also with the in-
creased amount of business it would be impossible for any one person to
remember all the circumstances which preceded the making of each written
instrument.
To sum up, this note has attempted to point out the most important
change which has taken place in Pennsylvania in the Parol Evidence Rule,
13311 Pa. 315 (1933).
14Wagner v. Marcus, 288 Pa. 579 (1927); Myers v. Gibson, 304 Pa. 249 (1931); Title
Holding Co. v. Black, 306 Pa. 352 (1932); Madison-Kipp Corp. v. Price Battery Corp., 311
Pa. 22 (1933); Architectural Tile Co. v. McSorley, 311 Pa. 299 (1933); Lake Erie Nursery
&Seed Co. v. Edwards. 86 Pa. Super. Ct. 103 (1925).
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and to show the reasons why the later cases have repudiated the old, liberal
rule, and have now adopted the strict majority rule.
Spencer Gilbert Hall.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-EFFECT OF INDORSEMENT IN
TRUST FOR A THIRD PERSON
Under Section 36(3)1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the indorse-
ment of a note "To A in trust for B" is a restrictive indorsement which, by
operation of Section 47,2 terminates the negotiability of the note. Hence the
effect of such an indorsement is that the restrictive indorsee is not a holder in
due course but takes the note subject to all defenses good against the maker
or indorser. Such was the holding in the case of Gulbranson-Dickinson Com-
pany v. Hopkins,3 in which the facts were these: The Brenard Manufacturing
Company agreed to deliver certain advertising matter to the defendant Hop-
kins, in consideration for which the latter delivered his promissory note to the
Brenard company, payable to said company. The Brenard company, being
indebted to the plaintiff Gulbranson-Dickinson Company, delivered this note
to the latter; indorsed as follows: "Pay to the order of Iowa City State Bank
for credit account of Gulbranson-Dickinson Company." Meanwhile, the
Brenard company failed to deliver the advertising matter as per the original
contract with the defendant maker, Hopkins. By statute, the Gulbranson
company brought an action in its own name as restrictive indorsee against
the maker. Held, the plaintiff was a restrictive indorsee under Section 36(3)
of the Act: that, under Section 47, the act of indorsement terminated the
negotiability of the note; that the plaintiff was therefore not a holder in due
course, but took subject to defenses good against the payee Brenard company:
that therefore failure of consideration by the Brenard company was a valid
defense against the plaintiff.
That such was not the law prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law is
indicated in the result obtained in the leading case of Hook v. Pratt,, decided
'Section 36 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, Act of May 16, 1901, is as follows : "An
indorsement is restrictive which either :
1. Prohibits the further negotiation of the instrument; or
2. Constitutes the indorsee the agent of the indorser; or
3. Vests the title of the indorsee in trust for. or to the use of, some other person.
But the mere'absence of words implying power to negotiate does not make the indorse-
ment restrictive."
2Section 417 is as follows : "An instrument negotiable in its origin continues to be negoti-
able until it has been restrictively indorsed, or discharged by payment or otherwise."
3l70 Wis. 326, 175 N. W. 93, (1919).
478 N, Y. 371, (1879).
